SUMMARY An authenticated encryption scheme provides a mechanism of signing and encrypting simultaneously, and furthermore, the receiver can verify and decrypt the signature at the same time. Tseng et al. proposed two efficiently authenticated encryption schemes which can check the validity of the sent data before message recovery, but in fact their schemes cannot achieve completely the function. In this article, we point out the flaw and propose an improved scheme of revision.
Introduction
In 1993, Nyberg and Rueppel proposed a digital signature scheme with message recovery based on discrete logarithms [9] , [10] . For reducing the communication cost of Nyberg and Rueppel's schemes, Horster et al. proposed an authenticated encryption scheme afterward [2] , and there have actually been quite a lot of efficient authenticated encryption schemes presented since then [4] , [5] , [8] , [11] , [13] . In these schemes, the signer produces a signature for a message and then sends the signature to a specific receiver. After receiving the signature, only the receiver can recover and verify the message.
In an authenticated encryption scheme, signer may split a message into several blocks. Therefore, with approach of encryption and signature for individual message, the authenticated encryption scheme demands efficient computing and the less use of bandwidth for data communication. So far, a number of authenticated encryptions with message linkage protocols have been proposed [8] , [12] . Tseng et al.'s schemes [12] are the most efficient in terms of the communication and computation cost than all other schemes proposed previously.
In this paper, we show that propose an improved scheme. The security analysis of the proposed scheme is discussed in Sect. 4. Finally, the conclusion is given in Sect. 5.
The Weakness of Tseng et al.'s Scheme
Tseng et al. proposed two efficiently authenticated encryption schemes: basic scheme and generalized scheme [12] . The former scheme is suitable for all-or-nothing flow encryption. It is more efficient than all other proposed schemes in the costs of communication and computation. However, this scheme has a drawback that the receiver must wait for the arrival of the whole signature blocks. Therefore, Tseng et al. proposed the generalized scheme in order to avoid this weakness. In other words, the receiver can receive and recover a message in the meantime.
Review of Tseng et al's Basic Scheme
The basic scheme Tseng et al. proposed contains three phases: the system initialization, the signature generation, and the message recovery phases. The scheme has a system authority S A, a signer U a and a receiver U b . In the system initialization phase, S A publishes system parameters including p, q, g and f . The parameter p is a large prime number and the parameter q is a large prime factor of p − 1. Let g be a generator with order q in GF(p), and f be a one-way hash function. A user U i chooses a private key x i and calculates one's public key y i = g x i mod p. In the signature generation phase, the message M is separated into M 1 , M 2 , · · ·, M n , where M i ∈ GF(p) and i ∈ 1, · · · , n. When U a wants to send a message M to the receiver U b , U a first sets up r 0 = 0, chooses a random number k ∈ GF(q), and then calculates r i , r, and s as follows:
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In message recovery phase, when U b receives the whole signature blocks, U b calculates r as follows: 
Cryptanalysis of Tseng et al.'s Scheme
In Tseng et al.'s scheme, the purpose of Eq. (1) is to ensure that signature blocks are not falsified by someone, but it is unable to achieve the goal. Herein, we assume that someone attempts to destroy the message flow with the following procedures:
Step1. Generate an incorrect r i .
Step2. Obtain r from r = f (r 1 r 2 · · · r n ).
Step3. Delivery (r , s, r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n ) to U b .
The receiver must check the correctness of the message flow to assure that the signature blocks are not falsified or lost while obtaining the message flow of signature. Therefore, the receiver U b executes Eqs. As the result, the receiver cannot discover that the recovery message is not the same as the original message M. Tseng et al.'s generalized scheme is designed for package switch networks, but it still has the same problem.
The Proposed Scheme
To avoid message flows altered by attackers and the receiver's unawareness, we propose an improvement of Tseng et al.'s scheme. The basic concept is the same as that of Tseng et al.'s scheme, including parameters (p, q, g, f (·), x a , y a , x b , y b , m) and three phases. We go into the proposed scheme as follows.
Signature Generation Phase:
The message M is separated into M 1 , M 2 , · · ·, M n , where M i ∈ GF(p). While U a wants to send a message M to U b , U a executes the following processes to produce the signature blocks:
Step1. Set r 0 = 0 and choose a random number k ∈ GF(q).
Then compute y k b and t = g k mod p. Step2. Compute the values r i ,r, and s as follows:
Message Recovery Phase:
When U b receives the whole signature blocks, U b recovers the message blocks as follows. U b checks the following equation whether it is equal or not:
If the above equation holds, U b calculates r and recovers the message blocks M i as follows:
The proposed scheme is also appropriate for conducting Tseng et al.'s generalized scheme in the similar way.
Security Analysis
The security of the proposed scheme is based on the difficulties of one-way hash function [3] , [6] and discrete logarithms [1] , [7] , [14] . In this section, we analyze some possible attack situations and prove that the proposed scheme can successfully withstand these possible attacks. Attack 1: An adversary attempts to derive the user's private key x i from the available public information.
Analysis of Attack 1:
Assume that an adversary wants to derive U i 's private key x i from the corresponding public key y i = g x i mod p. It is as difficult as breaking discrete logarithms to obtain U i 's private key x i . With the knowledge of signature (t, s, r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n ), the adversary has no ability to disclose the secret key x a , which is based on the digital signature algorithm. The adversary also cannot derive secret value k through Eq. (4), since the equation has two unknown variables k and x i where the k is also under the protection of discrete logarithms. Attack 2: An adversary tries to forge an authenticated encryption signature (t, s, r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n ).
Analysis of Attack 2:
Generating a valid signature must utilize the private key of signer. We have proven that an adversary cannot derive U a 's private key x a on Attack 1. Thereupon, an adversary is incapable of forging any valid signature without knowing x a , and any forged signature cannot pass the verification via Eq. (4). Attack 3: An adversary attempts to recover the message M from an authenticated encryption signature. Analysis of Attack 3: From Eq. (4), the message M can be recovered by anyone who has the private key x b and is capable to compute y k b . Similar to Attack 1, it is difficult to break discrete logarithms to obtain a user's private key. Attack 4: An adversary upsets message flows and the receiver does not recognize.
Analysis of Attack 4:
If an adversary upsets message flows, the incorrect messages will be detected by the receiver. The receiver can verify whether the signature blocks are destroyed or lost by recomputing r and s in Eqs. (4)- (6) . Similar to Attack 2, it is too difficult to obtain U i 's private key x i by breaking discrete logarithms. Furthermore, an adversary cannot find some another values r i (r i r i ) satisfying r = f (r 1 r 2 · · · r n ). The r is under the protection of one-way hash function.
Conclusion
In this article, we enhance the security of Tseng et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme also can apply to the generalized scheme of Tseng et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme not only satisfies requirements of Tseng et al.'s scheme and protects user's private data certainly, but also achieves the security we mentioned above. Furthermore, we also analyze the security of our scheme in previous section. Our scheme can not only resist any adversary's attacks, but also detect the correctness of signature blocks. The proposed scheme is more secure than Tseng et al.'s scheme.
